While individual evaluations of and identification with social groups have been shown to influence political opinions, this effect is often treated as constant. Little work has examined dynamic relationships between issues, identity, and opinion as a function of changes in the political context. Elite rhetoric changes over time; in response to these changes, the weight that group evaluations and identification has on issue opinion should also vary. To test this argument, I use a content analysis of abortion rhetoric in combination with survey data from the ANES. Results suggest that messages confirming or threatening values or beliefs tied to one's religious in-group affect support for legalized abortion among Catholic and Mainline Protestants, but not Evangelicals. Additionally, individuals' strength of religious identification acts as a moderating factor for framing, more consistent framing effects are observed among both the weakest and strongest identifiers, but not among moderate identifiers.
Social Identity and Group-Implicating Rhetoric in a Dynamic Framing Environment
Politics is a game of inches. By the very nature of the political system, candidates need merely to pass a threshold of 'one more vote than the other guy' to obtain office. While political outcomes are almost never so close, the fight at the margins for supporters drives elites to engage in rhetorical strategies that will theoretically maximize their support, crafting rhetoric to maximize their support among varied constituencies. A means of doing so is through appeals to individual social identities. Identity has been shown to be such a powerful political tool that the identity compositions of political audiences affects the manner with which rhetoric is crafted, and even how campaigns are run (Dickson and Scheve 2006) .
In this paper, I consider the other side of the equation. Given that elites have clear incentives to appeal to citizen identity to enhance support, how does individual identity affect the ways in which citizens process elite rhetoric? Faced with a varied information environment, which messages resonate with voters, while others die out? Using a content analysis of the rhetoric surrounding the debate over legalized abortion in conjunction with survey data from the ANES, I
show that messages must resonate with core values connected to one's social identity to move opinion, but the efficacy of such appeals is moderated by the strength with which individuals hold that identity.
Turning From the Outside In
Despite the influence that identity has in shaping perceptions of the world and social behaviors, often times analyses of such behaviors focus on external characteristics representative of that identity without considering the mechanisms through which identity comes to bear. To do so requires turning from the external inward. Why is social identity such a potent political tool for elites, as well as a useful heuristic for individuals? An individual's identity may be thought of as an amalgamation of multiple components, comprised of the different aspects that comprise the self.
One's identity may consider of their gender, their race, their religion, their occupation, or one of any number of categorizations used in reference to oneself, based upon perceptions of shared beliefs and interests with others (McClain et al. 2009 ).
Given the many hats we wear as individuals, it is unsurprising that social identity is variable.
As noted by Brewer (2001) , at times, some aspect of our identity may be more salient than another, yet all remain part of who we are. At different times, with different circumstances, particular aspects of one's identity can be made salient, determined to a great extent by the social context. This has important implications for an individuals' worldview generally, and more importantly, for how they view politics and relevant political issues (Duncan and Stewart 2007) . Identity has long been thought to be an important component to social behavior. From the work of Tajfel exploring the influence of even groups formed on the most arbitrary of categorizations (Tajfel 1970) , to more recent work detailing the ways worldviews and opinion are shaped by visible identification with social groups such as race and gender (Burns 2001; Conover 1988; Conover and Sapiro 1993) which in turn influence political views, identity and group considerations have played an important role in our understanding of how individuals process information and form opinions.
Religion as Political Identity
Religion and religiosity matter for the behavior of elites and citizens alike. Politicians, attempting to court favor with voters, make use of religious symbols and language (Calfano and Djupe 2009; Layman 2001; Leege et al. 2002) , designed to curry favor among like-minded voters (Albertson 2011) . In the minds of citizens, religious beliefs and orthodoxy serve as frames of reference through which issues are viewed (Cochran and Beeghley 1991; Cochran et al. 1996) ,
shaping support for moral issues such as the death penalty (Unnever, Bartkowski, and Cullen 2010;  The preponderance of studies in the framing literature focus on changes in individual opinion in response to an argument, or frame, in laboratory (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997) , or survey experiments (Kinder and Nelson 2005; Sniderman and Theriault 2004) . While these works have done much to further our understanding of citizen response to frames, they simplify political communication in such a way as to hardly resemble the reality of political life. Issues and their frames are not constants (Chong and Druckman 2007) , nor do they exist (at least not typically) in an uncompetitive vacuum. Politicians engage in conflict over issues, struggling to frame them to their benefit. Successful frames are embraced, and weaker frames are abandoned (Jerit 2004) . The effects of frames should themselves be non-constant as well -some arguments are perceived as compelling, while others ring hollow, producing varied effects on opinion (Chong and Druckman 2010) . Such moderation has been shown to be driven by preexisting beliefs, where congruent arguments are accepted while arguments seen as inconsistent with prior beliefs are discarded (Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Zaller 1992) .
Only a small subset of research on framing effects has attempted to represent elite debate more realistically, considering competition among frames and variation in frames' persuasiveness.
Experimental work on the subject has shown that, in balanced competition, frames cancel one another out, and individuals on average revert to their initial opinions (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Sniderman and Theriault 2004) . Conversely, work varying the frequency of frames shows that frames do not necessarily cancel, but rather individuals focus on the quality of the arguments when forming and expressing judgments, rather than the quantity (Chong and Druckman 2007) . Over time, more recent messages appear to hold greater sway, as prior framing effects decay (Chong and Druckman 2010) . Framing effects are thought to persist only if recipients are predisposed to consider rhetorical information in a systematic manner ).
While such research is clearly an important step forward in testing framing effects under more realistic circumstances, it only approximates answering the question of how larger variation in relative salience among competing messages influences opinion, a key component of Zaller's (1992) model of opinion formation. In the model, Zaller argues that the increased prominence of considerations increases the likelihood that individuals will make use of those considerations when expressing opinions, where the availability of considerations is a function of both awareness (the likelihood of receiving the message) and prior beliefs (the likelihood of accepting the message).
Extending this to competition among frames suggests that the influence of frames will be greatest when they are not only more salient relative to competing messages, but they also resonate with recipients. In the following section, I describe how I apply general framework to the specific case of identity as a moderator of framing effects.
The Interplay of Frames and Identity
Framing effects have been shown to be moderated by personal characteristics, including political sophistication (Peffley and Hurwitz 2007) and cognitive ability more generally, where such considerations affect the ways in which individuals process information, potentially limiting the persuasive impact of the appeal. Identity should serve as another form of moderator, where values and beliefs tied to that worldview motivate processing of frames. Messages may affirm, or threaten identity; in each, identity should condition responses to frames, leading them to have a greater impact on subsequent judgments, or be irrelevant to one's identity, leading them to be ignored. As identification with a group intensifies, the ability of group members to perceive group-implicating messages should also increase (Kelly 1988), leading to greater in-group bias in the context of forming opinions (Tajfel and Turner 1986) .
In this vein, threatening messages are particularly potent triggers of social identity. Appeals which emphasize conflict among groups on issues those groups hold to be important raise the importance one's own group plays, leading to identity-reinforcing behavior, (Tajfel and Turner 1986) as a function of strength of group attachment (Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears 1999) , increasing resistance to changing those beliefs (Dardis et al. 2008 ). Appeals need not even mention groups directly to trigger group-centric thinking. Winter outlines a process that he describes as group implication (Winter 2005 (Winter , 2006 (Winter , 2008 , in which rhetoric describing issues in the context of group traits may invoke perceptions of groups. Thus, elite appeals that highlight values and beliefs held by groups should also make identity more important for recipients in subsequent judgments. This leads to the following general hypotheses:
H1 (Relevance Hypothesis): As the salience of frames implicating an individuals' in-group increases, the effect of identifying with that group on opinion should increase.
H2 (Strength Hypothesis):
As the strength of group identity increases, the effect of group implicating frames on opinion should increase.
To test these hypotheses, I examine the interplay between the debate over legalized abortion and religious identification, and the implications of these interactions for individuals' support for abortion. Abortion remains a controversial issue, whose debate has received a great deal of media attention since the Supreme Court's initial ruling on Roe v. Wade (Armstrong and Boyle 2011) . It is also an issue about which many citizens have well-rehearsed, crystallized views, making them resistant to change, making abortion a challenging test subject.
Groups, Frames, and the Debate over Legalized Abortion
Abortion was forced into the public eye on January 22, 1973, when the Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. In response, competition to control the agenda emerged. For the first time, abortion was described as a woman's right, rather than simply a medical issue (Condit 1990 ). This claim firmly linked it to the interests of the women's movement and the feminist cause more generally (Luker 1984) . Newly outspoken supporters argued that legalized abortion was an important issue for gender equality and women's rights (Hull, Hoffer, and Hoffer 2004; Schiewe 2004) , as well as a point of limitation for government interference into what was ultimately a personal decision (Cook 1998) . In response to this initial framing, opponents struck back, stressing the sanctity of life and the amorality of abortion (Ferree et al. 2002 ). These opposing frames described abortion as tantamount to murder (Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt 2005) , with profoundly negative implications for the state of motherhood and the family (Cook 1998) . Over time, these rhetorical frames (as well as opposition to legalized abortion more generally) were linked to organized religious groups. Catholics, as the primary opposition to legalized abortion lead the charge, espousing the sanctity of life as the cornerstone to their doctrinal opposition to legalized abortion (Jelen 1984; Tamney, Johnson, and Burton 1992) .
Protestants came later to the debate, raising a number of diverse arguments both in favor and against abortion. Unlike the Catholic Church, Protestantism not only lacks a central authority, and thus has no official position on abortion (Jelen 1988) , it is comprised of a number of denominations with relative autonomy. Evangelical Protestants mirror Catholics' opposition to abortion (Evans 2002; Hoffman and Johnson 2005) , with the two groups becoming much more similar in recent years; yet their opposition is driven by much different reasons. Their objection derives not from a belief about the sanctity of life, but rather from moral principle (Luker 1984) and an opposition to feminism (Ginsburg 1989; Luker 1984) . Rather than emerging from a central authority, as is the case with Catholics' views on abortion, Evangelical Protestant's views derive from scripture (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1992) . In comparison, Mainline Protestants have been much more permissive of abortion over time (Williams 1982) . The justification for their support stems from beliefs of tolerance, the equal 'personhood' of women, and the separation of church and state (Ferree et al. 2002) .
Characteristics of Abortion Rhetoric
To capture the specific elements of the debate over abortion, particularly the varied nature and salience of the frames invoked, I use a content analysis of abortion-related news coverage.
These data were collected as part of a project comparing rhetorical framing of abortion in the United States and Germany by Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002) . Their analysis is comprised of articles from both the New York Times and the LA Times, over the years 1972-1994. 1 For this analysis only the American data are utilized.
The debate over legalized abortion in the media has changed quite dramatically from its initial treatment as a physician's issue. As part of the project, Ferree and her colleagues sought to characterize the arguments brought to bear in support of and against abortion rights. In their coding of the articles, eight separate idea elements, or frames were identified: the sacredness of fetal life, balancing women's rights against the rights of the fetus, social morality, women's rights and equality, the role of the state in individual lives, the divisiveness of abortion, the social ramifications of criminalizing abortion, and the debate as to who pays the cost of conflict over abortion rights. The newspapers analyzed were selected due to their targeting of national, rather than regional audiences, in addition to their coverage of distinct geographic regions. This arguably captures the nature of media coverage of abortion across the country (Ferree et al, .
2 These idea elements were selected as part of the original data collection because they represented common idea elements espoused within both the United States and Germany. As described in Ferree et al (2002, pp. 53-4) , coders evaluated statements within the body of newspaper articles for these common elements using a three digit coding scheme, where the first digit captured the broader idea element regarding abortion, the second the specific argument, including the valence of the argument, and finally, the third digit describes the individualized arguments. Intercoder reliability of over 80% was obtained for the first two digits used to classify articles and frames. In addition to
In addition to articles being classified as one of the eight idea elements (an ambiguous, or missing category was also used to describe frames with no clear position), frames were classified as being pro-choice, pro-life, or neutral). A summary of the core arguments that comprise each of these frames is presented in the Appendix.
As a summary of the change in the use of frames over time, I create cumulative annual measures for each of these above. I use proportions, rather than raw counts to control for overall increases in the frequency of articles discussing abortion, which could lead to bias in estimating the influence of individual frames (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Simply relying on frequency counts could lead to estimates to place too much weight on the influence of abortion-related framing in later years relative to earlier years in the data. These proportions are plotted by frame, by year, in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 here
On average, the State Role, Fetal Life, and Social Morality frames were the most salient, as well as the most varied, occurring nearly 20%, 13%, and 13% of the time, respectively. On average, none of the other frames appeared above 10% of the time in any given year. More interestingly, a frame which has arguably come to typify the pro-choice side of the debate, the Women's Rights frame (Alvarez and Brehm 2002) was on average the least salient, at less than 7% of the time. Also, we see how at their lowest point, most frames are fairly similar, appearing from 2-5% of the time (the exception being the State Role frame, which at its least salient point still appeared 10% of the time).
Breaking the frames down by valence (pro-choice, pro-life, and neutral), the State Role frame is most prominently a pro-choice message (appearing 11% of the time), while the Fetal Life frame is the most these categories, a 'missing' category was generated to note the number of articles without recognizable idea elements. Personal religiosity should serve as an additional filter, affecting individuals' support for abortion through their processing of the varied frames. I measure strength of religiosity with selfreported frequency of church attendance (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Rhodes 1985) , which is thought to provide a better measure of personal religiosity than other measures such as self-identified 3 Protestant respondents are classified are separated using the criteria identified by Dougherty et al. intensity of identification (Harris and Mills 1985) . Religiosity should serve to reinforce the filtering effect of respondents' religious denomination, as the more frequently an individual attends religious services, the more closely they follow the teachings of their discipline, and consequently, their identification with their religious group should be stronger (Mockabee, Monson, and Grant 2001; Tamney, Johnson, and Burton 1992) . In addition, church communities have been shown to influence preferences by communicating particular attitudes (Crawford and Olson 2001; Wald, Owen, and Jr. 1988) .
Research Design
To test the effects of variation in framing on the influence of group identification on linked issues, I merge the content analysis described above with individual level survey data taken from the American National Election Studies. 4 The virtues of such an over-time analysis for testing the effects of framing dynamics are tangible. When compared to the majority of previous work examining framing effects, this over-time research design in which frames are allowed to vary naturally stands out in its ability to better approximate the 'real world' information environment. By capturing the true nature of political communication by measuring the relative salience of multiple frames, and allowing those frames to compete amongst one another, the study moves closer to a clearer understanding of true framing effects outside of the laboratory.
Explanatory Variables
Capturing the interplay of framing effects and religious identification requires a number of considerations, which are often overlooked in studies of media effects on opinion. While framing and media effects more generally are often treated as fixed constants in the minds of citizens, it 4 The ANES did not ask respondents their opinion on abortion in 1974, restricting the analyses to surveys conducted in 1972, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994. seems unlikely that they exist as constants, and instead, are likely to decay over time. Work examining the durability of campaign effects has shown, with limited samples, that the influence of political campaigns do persist over time (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004; Shaw 1999) , contrary to the minimal effects hypothesis, but that influence does decay in the minds of voters (Gerber et al. 2011 ) rather than persisting from the initial exposure.
To account for this natural decay of political and social communication in memory requires a more nuanced measure of framing effects over time, which allows the impact of messages and the duration of that impact to vary across individuals. To approximate this effect, I create a weighted sum of the frequency of each frame for the six months prior to the date of respondents' interviews by week, weighting the sums using an exponential decay function as described (but not tested) by Jerit and Simon (2011) . This modeling process takes the following functional form:
For each respondent i, and each frame f, Frame Salience is a scalar term, representing the weighted accumulation of a frame. The measure is comprised of two components: using the framing data, I calculate weekly sums for each frame based upon the rates of use of each frame (calculated separately for each valence, pro-choice, pro-life, and neutral) and the corresponding interview dates for each respondent for each year. Based upon respondents' interview dates in the ANES data, I create weekly sums for the use of each frame, beginning from the week leading up to the respondents' interview, tracking backward for 6 months. As a simplifying assumption, frames that are used in the same week are given equivalent weight. The second component, the frame weights, is calculated by multiplying Time, the number of weeks from the respondents' interview to six months prior, by λ, the rate of decay, 5 and then exponentiating the product. The vector of weights is multiplied by the matrix of weekly sums, and then collapsed to produce a row vector of weighted frames, for each frame, for each respondent. The exponential decay model specified above allows the frames accumulated over the week prior to the interview date to be given full weight, while frames used over the weeks prior to respondents' interview have a diminishing impact. Examples of this weighting scheme shown in Figure 2 , which illustrates varied rates of decay using different constants of decay, or λ.
Figure 2 about here
As can be seen in Figure 2 , small changes in values of λ produce a good deal of variation in the rate of decay a given message or slate of messages. As there is little theory describing the rate of decay for media messages, I allow the data to influence the decision as to the proper specification for λ. To do so, I estimate a series of models, regressing support for legalized abortion, a fourcategory measure, coded to run from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed) on the weighted frame measures, iterating the value of λ over the range of feasible values (between 0 and 1). Because I assume differential framing effects for frame valence, religious identity, and strength of religiosity, I estimate the models separately by frame valence, (prochoice, pro-life, or neutral), denomination, and level of personal religiosity. 6 From these estimates I select the value of λ which results in the best model fit.
7 These values for λ are shown in Table 1 . Following the calculations for λ, I estimate models separately for each religious denomination, frame valence, and level of personal religiosity. In addition to the measures of framing, I include controls for partisanship 8 , ideology, education 9 , gender 10 , and political identify with a religious denomination but state they never attend church are excluded from the analyses.
7 Given research in information processing which suggests that variation in characteristics of the individual and message affect information processing, and thus, are likely to affect the decay rates of the frames, I estimate separate λ parameters for each religious denomination, in addition to each frame valence (pro-choice, pro-life, and neutral), iterating values for λ by 0.1. Model fit is assessed using the Akaike Information Criterion. knowledge 11 . The full statistical models are presented in Tables 2-5 in the Appendix; for simplicity, I focus the discussion of the results on predictions for the change in the likelihood of supporting legalized abortion for the frames that have statistically discernible effects below. Findings are similar for the Strength hypothesis, which suggests that responsiveness to identity-implicating frames should vary by intensity of said religious identification.
The more frequently one attends services, the more consistently one should react to relevant frames.
Similarly to the Relevance hypothesis, which finds clear support for Catholics and Mainline 11 Political knowledge is measured using ANES interviewer's subjective assessments of respondents' level of political information, which has been shown to be n excellent measure of respondents' cognitive ability, as well as political knowledge (Bartels 1996) .
12 Probabilities are generated for the change in salience from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile for each of the frames, holding all other variables at their means.
13 These results are significant improvements upon naïve models which do not allow for the accumulation or decay of frames over time. These results are not shown.
Protestants, the Strength hypothesis is also reasonably well supported by Catholics and Mainlines, but less well among Evangelical Protestants.
To more clearly illustrate these results, I plot predictions for the changing likelihood of supporting legalized abortion by denomination, religiosity, and message valence in Figured 3-5. Contrary to expectations, the Social Meaning frame does not trigger a discernible response at any level of religiosity. Also somewhat surprising is the effect of the State Role frame. The argument, which stresses the proper role of government in facilitating or restricting abortion, appears to increase support for legalized abortion among Catholics, across levels of religiosity when the message is prolife or neutral. While the effects are largest among weak identifiers, they are present across levels of religiosity (excepting moderates). This presents a puzzle to be considered further, as to why suggesting government's right to restrict abortion rights would increase support among Catholics.
Catholics appear to be equally influenced by frames which threaten and affirm their identities, although movement on opinion is largest for those which affirm beliefs tied to that identity.
Mainline Protestants, conversely, appear to react more consistently to frames of all valences, albeit only partially in line with expectations. These results are shown in Figure 4 .
Figure 4 about here
Among Mainline Protestants, of the frames of theoretical interest, the Women's Rights frame is perhaps the most consistent influence on support for legalized abortion. This frame increases support when used in a pro-choice or neutral manner across levels of religious identification, although the effects are modest, increasing support by less than 10 percentage points. Of the other frames of concern, the Morality frame decreases support when used as a pro-life or neutral argument, but having no impact on support for legalized abortion when used as a pro-choice appeal as does the Social Justice frame, while the State Role frame increases support when used to assert the state's role in restricting access to abortion.
In another surprising result, the Fetal Life frame significantly decreases support when used as an anti-abortion appeal, as well as when it is used in an unvalenced manner across levels of religiosity, although the effects are strongest when the message is a pro-life one. Overall however,
Mainline Protestants appear to be moved most by frames which threaten their identity, often being moved away from supporting abortion rights. This should not, however be taken as a sign that Mainline Protestants were moved from a pro-abortion to an anti-abortion position, but rather, their more moderate positions made more conservative in response to pro-life rhetoric.
For Evangelicals, framing has little effect on their support for legalized abortion. As seen in Figure 5 , few frames even attain statistical significance, and the effects are particularly inconsistent across levels of religiosity.
Figure 5 about here
This would seem to suggest that, relative to the other religious denominations examined, Evangelical
Protestants would seem to be much more crystallized in their views toward abortion, and thus are less responsive to attempts to persuade. This supposition is potentially supported by the results shown in Figure 5 , where respondents who identify themselves as Evangelical Protestants but who only weakly identify with the denomination appear much more responsive to frames than those whose identity is more well-defined, although the results are not consistent with any expectations.
These findings would seem to be indicative of how well-rehearsed attitudes can allow individuals to shrug off framing effects, leading to more resilient, persisting opinions despite varied attempts to persuade.
As a whole, the Relevance hypothesis appears to be supported, while the Strength hypothesis garners less support. While Catholics, and more moderate, Mainline Protestants react to variation in framing of the abortion debate in expected ways, while more conservative Evangelical Protestants do not. Also interestingly, patterns of response to frames appear to be more consistent at both ends of the distribution of religiosity, rather than solely at the upper extreme, as espoused by the Strength hypothesis. Those with both modest religiosity (as captured by their infrequent attendance of church services) and those with extremely strong religious identities appear to be the most consistent in their responses. One could surmise that weak identifiers are moved more because their beliefs are less thought out, and thus less resilient, while those in the other extreme would encounter messages more frequently, given their investment in their identity. This does not, however, explain the blunted responses for those with more moderate identities. The somewhat inconsistent effects among these respondents of frames which would be expected to shape opinion suggests that there are additional possible factors moderating individuals' responses to the varied rhetorical appeals in the debate over abortion. While generally held values appear to influence responsiveness among members of denominations when particular values are invoked, there is further ground to be covered. One could speculate that the lack of effects for these respondents may be due to measurement error, perhaps social desirability bias on the part of respondents, although these can only be speculations at this time.
The complex interaction between a dynamic information environment and group identification, and the ways in which it influences opinion paints an interesting picture of framing effects on opinion. Frames are meant to tell citizens a story about how to think about issues. At the same time, group identification serves as a heuristic cue, allowing individuals to mitigate a lack of information on issues for which relevant groups have been implicated through framing. Examining these two explanatory factors together, and their joint effects on opinion, we see that variation in the salience of framing affects the degree to which group identification influences opinion, as does the strength of that identification.
Conclusions
Social groups serve as important foundations for political decision-making. The conventional wisdom regarding elite-mass communication has asserted that elites use rhetoric to frame issues in an attempt to sway opinion. Through these frames, relationships are established between social groups and political outcomes, with individual sentiment toward group coloring their opinion on framed issues. What this analysis has sought to uncover is the degree to which group sentiment persists as an enduring heuristic tool in light of continuously changing political contexts.
By delving more clearly into the threefold relationship between social groups, political rhetoric, and individual issue opinions, I show that the effects of group identification produced by framing on issue opinions are perhaps not as constant as previously thought.
Political issues and issue frames shift and change over time, through a process of issue evolution. As a function of this ongoing change, some issues rise above the rest to become front page news. Typically, these salient issues persist for a time, before being supplanted by other issues, fading from the memories of voters (Carmines and Stimson 1989) . As issues change, both in terms of the considerations that are relevant for evaluating them, but in their importance as well, the ways in which political elites frame these same issues also changes.
As a direct function of this process, the ways in which citizens evaluate those same issues should change as well. Issues are dynamic, but the sources of opinion are traditionally treated as static, a perspective that paints only a partial picture of public opinion. Using measures to describe the nature and salience of elite debate, I am able to take a much more nuanced approach, and in doing so, develop an understanding of how citizens respond to changes in elite framing.
In moving beyond a simple analysis of the effects of group identification on opinion by incorporating information about the political context at the time individuals are evaluating issues, this analysis is able to add to our understanding of the ways in which citizens respond to changes in elite rhetoric, not only with respect to their actual opinions, but also the weight given to particular considerations which in turn shape their opinion.
These results suggest quite strongly that the effects of identity on opinion are non-constant, shifting in response to the information environment. However, one must acknowledge that such a choice of design also comes with shortcomings. Unlike an experimental design, this work is forced to make assumptions about confounding factors. Are individuals in fact receiving the treatment?
Could they be receiving additional stimuli beyond the desired treatment? In an experiment, these concerns are alleviated, as the researcher has full control over exposure to all stimuli, while this design must acknowledge that these are real issues. In this circumstance however, it can be argued that these concerns are outweighed by the potential contribution. As noted above, the framing literature is filled with experimental studies showing us the effects that frames can have on opinion, while lacking a clear, empirical demonstration of real-world framing effects outside of the lab. While previous work in framing has done much to understand citizens' responses to frames, in many cases such studies lack even a realistic depiction of the rhetorical competition faced by citizens, a sentiment echoed by Don Kinder (but see recent work by Chong and Druckman for an exception):
"In the case of framing, an exploitable natural experiment requires a decisive shift in the deployment of frames in some real-world setting taking place in such a way that the putative effects on public opinion -if such effects there be -are fortuitously captured. Such serendipitous opportunities do not come along often, but it is nevertheless unnerving (to me at least) that we are still waiting for compelling demonstrations of framing effects in natural settings" (Kinder 2007, p. 158) .
By examining the effects of variation in framing on opinion, this project seeks to fill this gap in the literature.
Despite the advantages of external validity with this study's design, one cannot however ignore the potential for endogeneity in the design. The analysis is premised on the assumption variation in the nature and salience of various frames occurs independently of public opinion. Elites in this model are assumed to frame political events in order to move opinion through carefully crafted rhetoric (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Further evidence in this vein suggests that this agenda setting effect is further enhanced by media coverage of politics, which leads rather than follows opinion (McCombs and Shaw 1972) . While it is clear that politicians and the media should be capable of carrying the day when issues are unfamiliar to the public, it has been argued that, as issues become more salient to the public, politicians shift their positions in response to changes in the tide of opinion (Geer 1996) . This perspective suggests that, for mainstream issues, politicians would moderate their positions in an effort to seek the median opinion and maximize public response.
Conclusively separating between these two perspectives is beyond the scope of the analyses presented in this project. It can be said that, for issues without a prominent, everyday foothold on the front page, such as abortion, or the death penalty, public opinion should be relatively stable. In their recent study of framing and the death penalty, Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun (2008) find that death penalty opinion reacts to deviations from the equilibrium tone of the debate in the long-run. In these models, tone is determined by topic, or frame, which in turn responds to external events, such as a rise in exonerations. This would fit with the narrative laid out above, where we observe changes in opinion in response to variation in framing. Overall levels of media coverage of abortion do not seem to respond to events until the Supreme Court's ruling in Webster in 1989, as illustrated by Figure 1 . However, we see spikes in the use of particular frames corresponding to events, such as the Court rulings in 1983 and 1986, and Geraldine Ferraro's Vice Presidential candidacy in 1984. Thus, in the case of abortion, frames may be argued to respond to exogenous events, allowing them to shape opinion, rather than being endogenous to opinion.
Fundamentally, this project has sought to describe the evolution of associations between issues and social groups, and how this process affects opinion. By looking both at the establishment of and changes in the salience of linkages between issues and relevant social groups, it has taken a more nuanced look at the identity-to-politics link, while also bringing the study of issue framing outside of the laboratory. The results suggest that issue-framing does have a real-world impact on the role that identity plays in shaping opinion. Rather than a simple, constant effect, identity's influence on opinion appears to be variable, driven by shifts in the use of frames that call it to attention.
Future research building upon these findings would do well to study the generalizability of these findings. The issue at hand drove the focus on personal religiosity as a measure of identity;
however, work on the subject of religious identification has uncovered something of a puzzle.
While the influence of religion in politics has only appeared to increase (Domke and Coe 2008) , religious identification has appeared to decrease in recent years (Hout and Fischer 2002) , particularly among younger citizens, with religious identities becoming much more fluid over individuals'
lifetimes (Putnam and Campbell 2010) . Given this variability in personal religiosity with the increased presence of religion in politics, how would the theoretical framework apply to the current political landscape? While religious identities may appear more fluid, religious beliefs appear not to have changed, making this an interesting question to consider.
Extending the scope more broadly: considering abortion and religious identification was a nice test case for this framework, given that opinion toward abortion is considered to be among the most resistant to change among those held by citizens, demonstrating that citizens do react to changes in framing even on issues which they have spent a good deal of time and mental energy considering raises a larger question. How would one expect to see citizens respond when facing appeals on issues they have not considered as in-depth? How would they fare when facing appeals to disparate identities?
Citizens hold multiple identities which are relevant to a number of issues they face in the political realm. When understanding the relationship between framing, group identification, and opinion, this work has focused on identities that can be thought of as clearly exclusive, making clear tests of the Relevance and Strength hypotheses possible. However, when considering the nature of identification more broadly, citizens are likely to possess a number of group concepts with which they identify, each having varying salience in relation to their identity as a whole. When faced with appeals to different aspects of their identity, which appeal should win out? These are important questions which should be considered on subsequent research seeking to extend these findings. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
Fetal Life Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
Balancing Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 Morality Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
Women's Rights Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
State Role Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
Social Meaning Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 Pragmatic Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
Social Justice Frame 0 .1 .2 .3 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
Miscellaneous Frame Average Frame Salience 
Balancing frame
Comparing the rights of the fetus with the rights of the mother Women take priority; abortion is justified under certain circumstances.
Protecting the fetus is justified. A conflict exists between the mother and the fetus.
Social Morality frame

Is the issue of abortion a moral question? To what extent does it conflict with traditional values?
Abortion is morally neutral. Abortion is wrong, immoral. What are the criteria for morality in society?
Women's Rights frame
Debate as to the status of women and an inherent right to self-determination in the domain of their own person.
Women have a right to choose, limits are oppressive.
Abortion devalues motherhood.
The issue is the role of women in society.
State Role frame
Does the state have a role in determining the legality of what some consider a moral issue?
Abortion is an individual, private matter.
States have the right to outlaw abortion.
What is the role of the state as a moral actor?
Social Meaning frame
What are the consequences of legalized abortion for society?
Abortion allows for family planning, population control.
Permissive abortion laws are uncivilized.
What is the social impact of abortion?
Pragmatic frame
Weighing the costs and benefits of legalized/illegal abortion Legalized abortion is good for women's health.
Legalized abortion is dangerous.
What are the costs and benefits of abortion to society?
Social Justice frame
How do restrictions in access to abortion affect individuals? Is the cost of such restriction borne in an equal or unequal manner?
Restricting abortion is unjust. Restricting abortion does not violate constitutional rights.
The issue is fairness and justice to everyone equally.
Frame summaries come from Ferree et al. (2002, pp. 109-10) , and online at: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/abortionstudy/vars/iecodesframeset.htm. Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). Cell values are estimates from an ordered probit regression with robust standard errors. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. DV: support for legalized abortion, coded from 1 (abortion should never be allowed) to 4 (abortion should always be allowed). 
